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Page created by osanchez@ufl.edu
and kdawadzi@hotmail.com
.
Persuasive Media
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
MMC 5306, Section 2979, Fall 1998 (3 credits)
Selections from Eric Burroughs,
Virginia
Rada, Paul Harris, and Orlando
Sanchez
Clicking on a name above will take you to the
corresponding essay on this page.
Clicking on each name below will take you to
the writer's personal profile.
Burroughs,
Eric
In approaching persuasive communication, Stevenson
delves first into the idea of propaganda and what that means in the context
of international relations and the way nations promote their views abroad.
As he points out, even though the word takes on a certain nefarious and
deceitful character, it is still little more than an effort at persuasion
no matter which moniker is chosen (346-7). From here, Stevenson goes on
to describe public diplomacy, that is the efforts of countries to influence
other peoples by various means. In particular, he focuses on the activities
of the United States Information Agency, an arm of the government developed
after the start of the Cold War whose most notable activity was that of
promoting a US view and ideal of the world in the face of the continued
Soviet communist presence, certainly a role of propaganda (347-350). Though
the organization has grown into a much larger cultural representative of
the US and provider of information from forei!
gn countries for the US government, this was its original role.
But the idea of a propaganda arm coming from
a country who prides itself on freedom and its advancement in the world
seems strange since it would go against that very ideals of freedom, as
Shawn J. Parry-Giles points out. In his article, he illustrates how the
notion of propaganda was adjusted so as to serve the foreign policy goals
of the US under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, and how the
two administrations differed in their approach to using propaganda when
the concept itself conflicts with US conceptions of democracy (117). Parry-Giles
quotes Jacques Ellul in summarizing this tension between propaganda and
democracy: "...it is evident that a conflict exists between the principles
of democracyparticularly its concept of the individualand the
process of propaganda. The notion of rational man, capable of thinking
and living according to scientific patterns, of choosing freely between
good and evilall this seems opposed to the secret influences, the
mobili!
zations of myths, the swift appeals to the irrational, so characteristic
of propaganda" (117).
It was after World War II that Truman sought
to continue propaganda activities for the first time into peacetime. The
justification for this was that it would promote democratic values and
save those entrapped by communism. In attempting to justify this use of
propaganda in an democratic ideological framework, supporter of the measure
perceived it as a means to show the US in a positive, truthful manner,
showing the real image of the country that would include the good and bad.
It meant to depict the US as promoting the information and facts as opposed
to the Soviets who spread real propaganda of "lying" and "slandering" (120).
However, US officials quickly learned that a bland presentation of "truths"
promoting the good of democracy in the US had little appeal as opposed
to that coming from the Soviet Union (121). Then came the "Campaign of
Truth" that lasted from 1950 to 1952, which shifted the emphasis of American
propaganda from "public relations" to "psychological wa!
rfare," to "persuasion" rather than "mutual understanding" (122). Suddenly,
the earlier ideological basis for propaganda focusing of fact changed to
reflect the idea that "such alterations were presumably justified on the
grounds that democracy must be sustained at all costs, even if that meant
adopting more Soviet-like tactics of propaganda" (122). In this way, US
propaganda became more aggressive in nature since they realized the need
for it to be effective. At the same time, though, officials became concerned
that such a blatant hypocrisy would diminish America¹s credibility.
Thus, under the new Eisenhower administration,
this use of propaganda was reconsidered through the foundation of the USIA.
The great change brought about was simply that international information
coming from the US not appear openly propagandistic (124). "Overtly, propaganda
would function to explain America¹s actions to the world, which appeared
consistent with the ideals of democracy predicated upon truths. Covertly,
the United States would engage in an aggressive anti-communist campaign,
utilizing psychological warfare tactics to combat the Soviet enemy more
forcefully and presumably more effectively" (126). This meant clandestinely
sponsoring, guiding and giving cover to radio stations that aimed to undermine
communism in positions for which the US did not want to take responsibility.
In this way it could distinguish its real actions and ideological positions
and hide what Parry-Giles calls "the rhetorical paradox of a democratic
government engaging in the restrictio!
n of free flowing information and the subterfuge of rational thought"
(127).
It is this dichotomy between ideology and action
that has always been a characteristic of US foreign policy, but one particularly
evident for the duration of the Cold War in its effort to stamp out what
was perceived as the threat of Soviet Communism.
Parry-Giles, Shawn J. "The Rhetorical Tension Between Propaganda and Democracy: Blending Competing Conceptions of Ideology and Theory." Communications Studies 44 (1993): 117-130.
Stevenson, Robert L. Global Communication in the Twenty-First
Century. "Persuasive Communnication." 343-368.
White Plains, NY: Longman, 1992
Rada, Virginia
In chapter 14 on his book Global Communication in the twenty-first century, Stevenson focuses on the topic of persuasive communication. He presents a brief analysis of propaganda, or using his term, public diplomacy, making reference to the United States Information Agency (USIA). He also speaks about advertising highlighting that international advertising is increasing. Stevenson refers that the new global communications systems are efficient tools for governments and economics sectors to reach and influence public opinion, I suppose that it is understood that always communications systems have been efficient to influence people.
It is much what scholars have writing about persuasive communication and it is much what we have read about this. Stevenson just presents a compact information with different examples which permit illustrated the topic.
In the formation of stereotypes, influence in the self-identity and the role of the media in this process, an example comes to my mind. The refuse of the “stigma” of being Indians, commonly seen in many countries of Latin America. At this respect, Carrasco in a study about Indians migration in Ecuador points out that they “change their clothes in the bus terminal bathroom in Riobamba, in order to arrive in Guayaquil without seeming Indians.... They return talking like costeños, and some refuse to speak Quechua even in the local community” (Carrasco, 105). Obviously, in this case, this comportment not only responds to an impact of the media over this people, in fact, many of them do not have a direct relation with media. Other factors like history, socio-economic relations, believes and culture are probably much more important than the portrayal of the Indians in the media, nonetheless, it is important to mention how media contribute. We could allege Mexican good selling TV novelas or soap operas, with large acceptancing among audience in Ecuador and other Latin American countries, Indians roles here are poor and with a lack of values. Probably a better example is a disgusting but popular series called “La India Maria”, where the protagonist is a dumb, dirty and poor Indian woman. The latter produced by “Televisa” in Mexico. In relation with this program and attending critics from some sectors of the audience, Televisa president, Emilio Azcarraga, said “to educate is a task of the government and not of Televisa”. Personally I think that for good or bad, nobody has influenced the formation (or disformation) of today Mexican minds as Televisa and Azcarraga family.
If we apply here the expectancy theory, and follow several scholars who have observed that repeated exposure to stereotypical media portrayals will result in some society members accepting television depictions as reflecting reality, we could predict that Indians are like to behave in conformance to expectations. These negative values differences form the basis for making the others inferior, thus excluding then from the in group and in the other hand, increase the refuse of the Indians self - identity.
In other order of ideas, but following TV influence potential, Michael Pfau presents an interesting investigation where examines the role and relative impact of specific communication modalities on voter’s perception during the presidential primary elections “a formative period for many voters, a time when they mold their attitude” (125). This article argues that television communication exerts the most influence on voter perceptions of less know candidates in contested presidential primary campaigns. In such circumstances, candidates utilize television to foster an image of themselves in precisely those circumstances in which the medium’s potential for influence may be greated, the conditions of low involvement, low definition and indecision. In this context, the case of actual elections in Venezuela results very illustrative. Chavez, today first option to win election next December (according last survey), is one of the cases more representative where a person that nobody knew, in few minutes obtained popularity and charm, just with some few sentences broadcast by TV.
Winning more audience is the objective of TV businessmen, like Azcarraga family in Mexico, no matter how the program quality could influence and/or damage people. Winning ballots are the objectives of politicians like today in Venezuela where the political campaigns are being very aggressive. In the first case, how communication affects or influence in the perception of people is an indirect consequence. In the second case, how focus communications to influence in the perception of the audience and their candidates is the goal and in both, media play a relevant role in self-identity and consequent comportment.
Works cited
Carrasco, Hernan. (1997) “Indians of the Sierra in Quito and Guayaquil: Interethnic Relations and the urbanization of Migrants.” Pp. 95-110 in Migrants, Regional Identities and Latin American cities, eds. T. Altamirano and L.R. Hirabayashi. Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association.
Elliot, Richard and Kritsadarat Wattanasuwan (1998) “Brands as symbolic resources for the construction of identity.” International Journal of Advertising. Vol. 17 No. 1: 131-144
Mooij, Marieke de. (1997) Global Marketing and Advertising. Understanding cultural paradoxes. SAGE publications.
Pfaw, Michael (1995). “Influence of Communication Modalities on voters’ perceptions of candidates during Presidential Primary Campaigns”. Journal of Communications . Vol. 45 No 1:122-133
Stevenson, Robert, L. (1994) “Persuasive Communication”. Global Communication in the twenty-first century. Longman Publishing Group. P. 344-368
Paul Harris
Utilizing more factually driven information than the vast majority
of his other chapters, Stevenson’s chapter 14 “Persuasive Communication”
is still error-prone. Discussing the public diplomacy campaigns that
have become so prominent this century, Stevenson insists on presenting
a negative and cynical viewpoint on a matter that has tremendous potential
for real change in the global arena. Referring to public diplomacy
and information efforts as “propaganda” repeatedly, Stevenson divorces
himself from judicious and fair-minded reporting, and reveals himself for
the hugely partisan scholar that he is. Speaking of the public diplomacy
campaigns, Stevenson claims that it is debatable “whether mass media have
mass effects or only limited effects on audiences” (Stevenson 364) and
implies the futility of the efforts.
In reality, however, public diplomacy campaigns are paramount
to international relations and the continued success of the global system.
The New York Times ran a special last December on the immense impacts that
the United Nations Framework on Global Climate Change could provide.
The treaty, signed last year in Kyoto, Japan, required extensive “public
relations” efforts on behalf of the United States and the European Union
in order to convince developing nations, like those in Asia and Latin America,
of the enormity of the problem that every system and every people on Earth
were facing. It is not possible to dismiss this concerted effort
on the part of the West to influence the periphery as cultural imperialism,
colonialism, dependency revisited, or as any singular cynical argument.
The Kyoto treaty was a vital and necessary first step towards a problem
that faces every country. The public diplomacy was necessary only
because the peripheral states lacked the scientists and leading research
institutions that the West had employed in order to explore the problem.
As a further example of the benefits of public diplomacy, examine
the United States’ position on nuclear deterrence. Although admittedly
the US triumphs by restricting nuclear proliferation, the rewards are global.
Hugely unpopular arms control treaties in the developing world have only
been accomplished by the diplomacy initiated by the West. START-4
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) set to be signed into law by the US,
Russia, and for the first time, the former states of the USSR, required
significant public relations campaigns in order to convince the population
of the necessity of arms control. The nuclear standoff between India
and Pakistan earlier this year was halted when President Clinton threatened
to call off his long-awaited official State visit to the region later this
year.
Although public diplomacy can be manipulated in order to serve
Machiavellian motives of presidents, Stevenson fails to account for instances
in which it accounts for real and necessary change.
The New York Times “Clinton Lobbies for Treaty by Phone”, December
9, 1997 v. 147.
Stevenson, Robert L. Global Communication in the Twenty-First
Century. Longman Publishing Group: New York, 1994 pp 185-208.
Orlando Sanchez
In "Persuasive Communication," Stevenson examines how the "global communication system offers increasing opportunities for governments, private corporations, and occasionally individuals to reach and influence people around the world" (364). He takes a look at two particular aspects of this process: government engagement in "public diplomacy" or propaganda directed at the citizens of other countries and advertising. I will focus my critique on his analysis of the earlier one.
As Stevenson notes, U.S. public diplomacy efforts are directed through the United States Information Agency (USIA) or Service (USIS) as it is known abroad. As he characterizes the service, it can be seen as a harmless international public relations arm of the U.S. government, distributing U.S.-friendly materials (book, videos, magazines, chats, performances) to receptive, even if sometimes violent and antagonistic, foreigners. The non-amicable reactions generally stem from a perception that USIS, with its propaganda dissemination and local information gathering duties, functions as an "intelligence agency hiding behind cultural and educational exchange" (352). Stevenson counters that while the agency is indeed part of the U.S. foreign policy system, it does not involve itself in intelligence operations (352). He expresses puzzlement at the fact that foreigners so willing to express their discontent with the USIS with rocks and sticks would get "outraged when the agency surveys opinion on a more systematic basis" (352). Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that this characterization is not accurate and that foreign resistance to U.S. "public diplomacy efforts" can be understood as a reaction to U.S. efforts to establish its hegemonic presence in the world.
A more critical view of USIS can be found in Sussman and Lent's introduction to Transnational Communications: Wiring the Third World. From their point of view, the USIA arose as an integral component of a foreign policy paradigm based on modernization theory. Succinctly stated, the modernization school of development states that traditional societies can follow an uni-linear road to progress by following the U.S.-Anglo model. Stevenson would fall under the group of academics who pushes this position and portrays U.S. public diplomacy as a result of the efforts of a "benevolent big brother" (Sussman and Lent 5) to help its less fortunate neighbors. But as the authors point out, the role of the USIS in this foreign policy structure may be less lofty and unselfish. If information is indeed power, then the U.S. fought mush of the Cold War well-armed from its USIS trenches. By disseminating U.S. propaganda and keeping tabs on the local situation for Washington D.C., USIS offices served as campaign headquarters for U.S. efforts against the spread of Soviet influence (6). As the authors note, USIS successes were "measured in terms of the degree of Third World peoples' 'empathy' with First World elite mythology, without, of course, any requirements for First World people to reciprocate in kind" (6).
This argument goes back to the aspects of U.S. or Western domination of global media. The USIS, from an antagonistic foreigner's perspective, is seen as a tool of U.S. cultural and political domination and as an apparatus whose goal is to firmly establish regional U.S. hegemony. "Many critics have noted how this approach fit well within an integration model of Third World countries, in which they were to be subordinate to a U.S.-dominated world market system, media management structure, and political-military camp" (5). As the following quote shows, the USIS fits well with U.S. foreign policy goals and, thus, is a logic target for foreign dicontent. Note the hint to connections with the "spooks" that Stevenson denies (Stevenson 352).
"The U.S. government, in fact, has been the largest disseminator of information to the Third World. In the postwar years, its global network of USIA branches and 'cultural centers,' the Voice of America (with sister radio networks Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty . . .), its military and diplomatic telecommunications systems, the ubiquitous but largely secret media presence of the CIA, its subsidies to the Motion Picture Export Association of America and to multilateral worldwide information distribution, such as UNESCO, its active defense of Western, especially U.S.-based, news agencies via its "free flow of information" doctrines . . . have all helped to create a pro-U.S. political and cultural tableau. Such initiatives were also in line with its corporatist 'free market' isolation strategies against elements protectionist or socialist in outlook" (Sussman and Lent 6).
Once again, Stevenson's arguments fall short.
Sussman, Gerald and John A. Lent. "Introduction: Critical Perspectives
on Communication and Third World Development" in Transnational Communications:
Wiring the Third World. London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1991. 1-26.
Stevenson, Robert L. "Persuasive Communication" in Global Communication in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1994, 343-368.